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These briefings have been drafted by the Parliament Secretariat Task 
Force on the Intergovernmental Conference. Their purpose is to gather 
together, in an organized, summary form, the proposals and suggestions 
which the authorities in the Member States, the Union's institutions and 
specialist commentators have put forward on the issues likely to be on 
the IGC 96 ager.tda. 
Briefings will be updated as negotiations proceed. 
Already out: 
1 The Court of Justice 
2 The Commission 
3 The Court of Auditors, ESC and COR 
4 Differentiated integration 
5 The common foreign and security policy 
6 The role of the national parliaments 
7 The hierarchy of Community acts 
8 Codecision procedure 
9 CJHA 
10 European c:itizenship 
11 WEU, security and defence 
12 Public services 
13 Social policy 
14 The European Parliament 
15 The European Council 
16 The Council of the European Union 
17 Budgetary issues and the IGC 
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BRIEFING 
ON 
BUDGETARY ISSUES AND THE IGC 
SUMMARY 
Issues relating to the budget are not specifically identified in the Maastricht 
Treaty as falling within the scope of the 1996 IGC. Moreover, the financial 
perspective that was agreed in 1993 lays down the framework for annual revenue 
and expenditure until 1999, thus effectively precluding a revision of the own 
resources regime before the end of the century. 
However, the situation is less clear-cut than this might suggest: 
a statement attached to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 29 October 1993 
indicated that the institutions considered that "the budgetary provisions of 
the Treaty, including the arrangements relating to compulsory and non-
compulsory expenditure, should be reviewed at the Intergovernmental 
Conference scheduled for 1996, in order to achieve interinstitutional 
cooperation on a partnership basis••; 
the ratification of the own resources decision, designed to give effect to 
the financial perspective up to 1999 and to permit an increase in the level 
of own resources in 1995, has not yet been completed and has prompted a 
debate in some states about the level of their contribution to the budget of 
the Union, particularly in the context of future enlargement, thereby 
anticipating a discussion that was otherwise not expected until after the 
IGC; 
uncertainty as to the duration of the 1996 IGC and of the ratification 
procedures has led to the realisation that the apparent gap between the IGC 
and the debate on a new own resource regime is likely to be much less than 
anticipated and that the two processes may well become entangled. 
As a result, the budgetary question is now seen as one of the important themes 
of the IGC. It has been explicitly included in the work of the Reflection Group 
within the theme covering the "Instruments at the disposal of the Union" as well 
as more generally within the theme relating to the institutions, including the 
Parliament. And amongst the Member states we are starting to see the budgetary 
issues that are seen as central to the IGC, those that are likely to be held 
over and those that arouse very little debate either in favour or against. 
The European Parliament laid down the broad outline of the changes it would like 
to see in the budgetary field in its resolution of 17 May. In the coming months 
it will need to consider how best to pursue those changes and to answer a number 
of questions. How far should the budget debate anticipate the discussion over 
the shape of the financial perspective that expires in 1999? To what extent 
should the debate be limited to issues linked to the distribution of competences 
within the budgetary procedure rather than to the volume of expenditure to be 
devoted to particular policies? And how far should the priorities of the 
Parliament be reviewed to take account of the balance of opinion amongst the 
governments and parliaments of the Union? 
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I. POSITIONS TAKEN BY EU INSTITUTIONS 
The European Parliament 
Initial contributions to the budgetary debate were made by the Institutional 
Committee (in a working document by Mr LUCAS PIRES as well as in the reports of 
Messrs. BOURLANGES and MARTIN) and the Budgets Committee (draftsman, Mr 
CHRISTODOULOU). Subsequently, in its resolution of 17 May the Parliament the 
Parliament identified four priority areas for budgetary reform at the IGC: 
extending the scope of the expenditure of the Union that is to be included 
in the budget; 
revising the structure of revenue; 
reshaping the operation of the budgetary procedure; and 
intensifying the fight against fraud. 
Subsequently, on 12 July the Parliament reiterated its support for extending the 
scope of expenditure by voting in favour the BAGGIONI report which called for 
the integration of the European Develpment Fund into the budget. 
The changes sought by the EP can be divided into two categories: those designed 
to reinforce the role of the Parliament as one of the twin arms of the budgetary 
authority and broader modifications not directly related to the powers of the 
Parliament. On this basis one can classify the modifications sought by the 
Parliament as follows (Treaty articles requiring modification indicated in 
brackets): 
Changes in the role of the EP 
1. Broadening the range of expenditure over which the Parliament has a say, by 
incorporating the EDF, borrowing and lending and expenditure under the second 
and third pillars within a single unified budget (Article 199). 
2. Associating the EP in the fixing of revenue by giving it a right of assent 
over own resource decisions (Article 201). 
3. Eliminating the distinction between CE and NCE, thereby g1v1ng the EP an 
equal say with the Council in the determination of all expenditure (Article 
203). 
4. Simplifying the budgetary procedure by making the PDB, rather than the DB, 
the basis for EP first reading, whilst retaining the principle that the EP 
should adopt the budget ~Article 203). 
5. Reinforcing Article 138c which provides for parliamentary committees of 
inquiry as part of the fight against fraud. 
Broader changes 
1. Incorporating into the Treaty prov1s1Qns for multiannual financial 
programming (Articles 199 and 201A). 
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2. Modifying the own resource system, laid down in the decision on own resources 
provided for in Article 201: 
-to include the income of the ECB (seniorage income); 
- to make it possible for citizens to identify what resources are allocated 
to the Union; 
- to make it reflect the financial capacity of Member States; 
- to permit the fixing of an overall financial ceiling. 
3. Tightening measures designed to combat fraud, notably by strengthening the 
provisions for investigations within Member States and for sanctions in the 
fight against fraud (Article 209A). 
The Commission 
In its Report on the operation of the Treaty on European Union the Commission 
points without comment to the two interinstitutional agreements of 29 October 
1993 (laying down the financial perspective up to 1999) and of 6 March 1995 (on 
the inclusion of financial provisions in legislative instruments). 
The Commission also draws attention to two paradoxes which complicate the fight 
against fraud: 
that the Council requires unanimity to act against fruad but only a qualified 
majority to determine levels of expenditure; 
that Commission is liable in respect to execution of the budget whereas 
management is often decentralised, thus disassociating power and 
accountability. 
In relation to the CFSP the Commission refers to the complexity of the hybrid 
nature of the Treaty, with decisions under one pillar requiring funding under 
another. The result is "procedural debates instead of debates of substance". 
The Council 
In its Report on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union of 5 April the 
Council restricts itself to two comments on budgetary issues: 
Para. 70 "The experience gained in the area of CFSP financing shows up the 
discrepancy between the European Parliament's powers of political 
control and its budgetary power as the Parliament tries to increase its 
involvement in .the.CFSP by. exercising its budgetary powers. The funding 
of the CFSP has given rise to controversy and has not yet been 
resolved." 
Para.83 " ... The question of funding the implementation of Title VI is similar 
to that of funding the CFSP." 
The Court of Auditors 
In its report on the functioning of the Union the Court of Auditors proposed 
specific changes to the texts of the Treaty designed: 
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to recognize the Court officially as the Court of Auditors of the Union; 
to give it the possibility to go to the ECJ, in particular to protect its own 
prerogatives, 
to allow the Court to exercise control over all the expenditure of the Union, 
including that under pillars 2 and 3 of the Maastricht Treaty, 
to define more precisely the responsibilities of "ordonnateurs", financial 
controllers and accounting officers. 
The Reflection Group 
In the interim report which was published on 30 August the President of the 
Reflection Group indicated the direction of the discussion so far on budgetary 
questions, notably the system of own resources, the possibility of a fifth 
resource, multiannual planning, the budgetary procedure, the principle of 
sufficient means and the control of expenditure: 
Concerning own resources the majority of the group consider that the IGC should 
not handle the negotiation on the next financial perspective. Otherwise the 
agenda of the IGC would prove unmanageable. Some members, however, pointed to 
the link between the IGC, enlargement and a financial agreement. They would 
like to know "who will pay for what" before going ahead not only with 
enlargement but also with ratification of the outcome of the IGC. 
Independently of the question of when the own resource system is introduced, 
some members feel that the system of contributions to the revenue of the budget 
should be revised, by establishing a system which takes account of the relative 
prosperity of states, by reviewing the imbalance between the powers of the EP 
over expenditure and its minor role in relation to revenue or by setting up a 
real system of Community taxes rather one based on national contributions. 
One member of the group would like to incorporate multiannual financial planning 
in the Treaty but a clear majority would prefer to keep it outside, using the 
more flexible arrangement of interinstitutional agreements. 
There is general support for a simplification of the budgetary procedure with 
the idea notably of eliminating one of the two budgetary readings. However, the 
proposal to remove the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory 
expenditure is not accepted by the majority. The report points to an 
intermediate position whereby the Parliament would be able to amend a fixed 
percentage of compulsory expenditure. 
The principle of sufficient means is seen by some as encouraging moderation in 
the exercise of its legislative prerogatives by the Commission. Others consider 
that Article F3 provides provides a sufficient guarantee of this principle. One 
member felt that strengthening this principle would make it easier to accept the 
move from unanimity to qualified majority on certain sensitive aspects of 
secondary legislation, particularly those involving high financial cost for 
Member states. 
Some suggestions were put forward concerning the control of expenditure, 
including strengthening the role of the Court of Auditors in the fight against 
fraud, establishing cooperation with national audit bodies and increasing the 
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control of the ECOFIN and Budget Councils over the Councils more inclined to 
favour expenditure, in particular the Agriculture Council. 
Mr Westendorp suggests that one of the tasks of the group in the coming months 
should be to examine a possible proposal from the Group as to how to manage the 
interlinked issues of the IGC, the financial agreement and enlargement. 
In addition, the Group discussed the financing of the CFSP. There is a 
consensus that specific mechanisms need to be devised to ensure that funding can 
be guaranteed quickly. A very large majority considers that financing should 
be assured through the Community budget. 
!!.POSITIONS OF MEMBER STATES 
The debate outside the Parliament on the revl.Sl.On of the budget has been 
relatively narrow in scope up to now. However, one can identify certain trends: 
concern as to the volume of revenue made available to the Community budget 
or the volume of expenditure received from it; 
reluctance to combine the IGC discussion with the debate on the future size 
of the budget; 
wide support for including the financing for CFSP entirely within the 
Community budget; 
few expressions of view on changes in the role of the European Parliament in 
the budgetary procedure. 
Belgium 
In the political note that it sent to the Parliament on 28 July the government 
indicated that the it did not consider the IGC to be the appropriate forum in 
which to discuss the shape of the budget of the Union and in particular, the 
size of the structural funds or the CAP. It notes that the simple extrapolation 
of the existing levels of expenditure would be impossible to pay for and that 
solutions will be have to be found by the use of transitional mechanisms. 
In the same document the government does come out in support of including the 
finance for CFSP within the budget. 
Germany 
There has been considerable discussion about the financial burden of the 
Community budget. In its decision of 12 May the Bundesrat prefaced its approval 
of the new own resources decision with the demand that the disproportionate 
burden of the budget on Germany be corrected in the post-1999 financial 
perspective, with a .new system. that takes account of per capita income and 
purchasing parities. It called for future financing to be one of the themes of 
the 1996 IGC. 
In Bild Zeitung of 19 June Thee Waigel, the Finance Minister, reiterated that 
the actual distribution of burdens was no longer acceptable for Germany and that 
the issue would be put on the agenda by Germany at the 1996 IGC, even though a 
new system can only come into effect after 1999. 
The German government has expressed its support for two other budgetary reforms: 
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an amendment to the existing prov1s1ons on financing the CFSP so that there 
can be adequate financial means inside the Community budget to cover common 
actions; and 
tighter control of fraud and auditing. 
Mr Waigel rejected the idea that the EU should raise its own taxes or make its 
own borrowings. (Financial Times, 6 April 1995) 
Greece 
In an initial document submitted in January 1995 the Greek government emphasised 
the importance of economic and social cohesion and the need for transfers of 
funds to the less-developed areas. It suggested that under the third stage of 
EMU it will be necessary to examine the overall size of the budget and the 
criteria for distributing funds. The accession of the Central European 
countries will require a greater budgetary effort. 
Spain 
In Agence Europe of Wednesday 5 July, Mr Solana, Spanish Foreign Minister, 
stressed the need for the IGC to look at the problem of own resources in the 
light of future of enlargement, pointing out that the Member State most keen on 
enlargement do not intend to increase their contribution to expenditure. 
In its document on the 1996 IGC, the Spanish government makes clear that if 
economic and social cohesion comes on to the agenda, then there should be 
consideration of the following: 
elimination of the regressive effects of the third VAT resource; 
strengthening of the structural funds; 
introduction of a fifth, progressive own resource; 
possibly, new alternatives such as financial equalisation mechanisms. 
However, it argues that the issue of funding should not be considered at the IGC 
as it is likely to endanger the meeting's success. The CAP and cohesion should 
be considered during accession negotiations. 
France 
The discussion on budgetary issues in France has been concentrated in the 
Parliament where the following positions have been taken: 
support from the Delegation for the European Union for including borrowing 
and lending in the budget (Report of Mrs Ameline and Mrs Catala, p.90) 
firm opposition to the elimination of the distinction between compulsory and 
non-compulsory expenditure (Report of Mrs Ameline and Mrs Catala, p.90). 
support for limiting the power of the European Parliament to amend the 
budget, following the example set by Article 40 of the French Constitution. 
In particular, it has expressed its opposition to the scattering of 
appropriations ("saupoudrage des credits") and wishes to prevent the 
Parliament from introducing amendments which have this effect. 
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rejection of the inclusion of financing for the CFSP within the Community 
budget. 
Luxembourg 
The Luxembourg government, notably in its position paper on the IGC (see Agence 
Europe, 6 July 1995) has expressed its support for: 
reexam1.n1.ng the budgetary provisions of the treaties to make them more 
effective, notably through improvements in the means available to the Court 
of Auditors to carry out investigations in the fight against fraud; and 
including the finance for CFSP within the budget. 
Austria 
The Austrian government (in its memorandum of June 1995) came out in support of 
including the finance for CFSP within the budget. 
The Netherlands 
The discussion in the Netherlands over budgetary questions is overshadowed by 
the unwillingness of the Dutch Parliament up to now to ratify the own resources 
decision giving effect to the financial perspective proposed at the Edinburgh 
European Council in December 1992. There is considerable disquiet as to the 
impact of that decision on the Netherlands and in particular, the extra 
financial burden it will involve. 
There is a debate as to how to reduce the net Dutch contribution to the budget. 
For example, in February 1995 the Dutch Ministry of Finance wrote to the Dutch 
Parliament concerning the financial relationship of the Netherlands to the 
European Union. It specifically presented the net position of the Netherlands 
vis-a-vis the EU budget and argued for a system of net limiters designed to 
eliminate excessive differences between receipts and payments. 
In addition, in its document presented in view of the IGC in relation to the 
third pillar, the Dutch government (Agence Europe, 5 August 1995) argues that 
Community financing has clear advantages over intergovernmental financing and 
wants the Treaty to specify what should come under each heading. 
As far as the powers of the EP are concerned, it should be recalled that support 
for giving the EP the right of assent over revenue was expressed by the Dutch 
government in its draft treaty text during the Maastricht negotiations in 
September 1991. 
Portugal 
The Portuguese government and the Portuguese parliament (resolution of 2 March) 
have both expressed their support for extending the budgetary provision for 
economic and social cohesion in the context of enlargement. 
United Kingdom 
The British government has expressed the wish to combat fraud more effectively, 
laying particular stress on a modification of the role of the Commission. On 
12 January Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary, suggested making the Commission 
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more accountable to the Council and on 3 February the Prime Minister argued for 
"a more efficient, cost-conscious Commission". 
The inclusion of finance for CFSP within the budget is opposed by the British 
government. 
* * * * * 
For further information related to this briefing, please contact Mr Michael 
SHACKLETON, Tel. 2732 (BXL). 
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